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 Formally insuring the informally
insured
Rainfall is critical for the livelihoods of millions of Indians –
yet many have no formal insurance if the rains fail. This
column looks at what happens when a new formal
insurance policy based on the weather is offered at
random to farmers and farm workers across several states
in India.
Agriculture is risky business. Unpredictability stems from crop
diseases, price volatility in markets, and natural disasters. In
India, it is estimated that about 90% of variation in production
levels is caused by fluctuations in rainfall levels and patterns.
One mechanism for coping with this variability that is garnering
increased attention is insurance against bad weather (known as
index-based weather insurance), in which pay-outs are based on
a publically observable measure or index, such as local rainfall.
Tying pay-outs to rainfall implies that the insurance company is
not affected by any particular farmer’s actions or risk profile,
and it also eliminates the need for in-the-field assessments,
thereby lowering the cost of providing insurance.
Formal and informal insurance
While the market for such insurance products has not yet
developed widely in rural India, this does not imply that poor
farmers are currently uninsured. Rural populations have for
centuries depended on their caste, or jati-based networks to
manage risk. Jati members informally insure each other through
gifts and loans to cope with both agricultural risks and
household-specific risks such as death, illness or theft. Such pre-
existing informal risk sharing may affect the market for formal
index insurance. To understand these interactions, Mark
Rosenzweig and I, together with colleagues from the Centre for
Micro Finance at IFMR, and the Agricultural Insurance
Company of India, conducted a field-based study in which we
marketed a monsoon insurance product to around 5,000
farmers in the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh. The product was designed to be very simple, providing
increasing pay-outs the longer the delay in the onset of the
monsoon.
This research studies the demand for, and effects of, this formal
index-based rainfall insurance in an environment of pre-existing
informal insurance. While some farmers may be less likely to
purchase formal insurance if they know they can depend on
their jati members in the event of a crisis, risk-sharing within
the jati may be incomplete, leaving farmers exposed. This is
important from a development and policy perspective because
farmers facing higher risk are more likely to invest in safer but
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farmers facing higher risk are more likely to invest in safer but
often less profitable production methods, asset portfolios, and
crops, perpetuating poverty. Jati members who are partially
liable if their risk sharing partner fails may actually prevent
their partners from engaging in risky investments. Thus,
understanding the interactions between formal and informal
insurance can shed light on how to help farmers manage their
risk and shift their resources towards more productive
technologies. Moreover, introducing a formal insurance product
may change the pre-existing informal risk sharing relationships.
There are two unique features of this study:
First, offers of insurance were randomly assigned among groups
of farmers for whom the nature and extent of their jati-based
informal risk-sharing were carefully measured by the researchers.
Therefore, it allows for a nuanced understanding of the
relationship between informal and formal insurance mechanisms.
Second, the weather insurance product was marketed to
households that work in the agriculture sector (agricultural
labourers), as well as to land-owning cultivators. This is
important because the income of agricultural labour is just as
dependent on seasonal weather patterns, but this group has
traditionally been excluded from formal insurance marketing.
Untapped market
We find that in Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh there was
almost equal demand for the insurance product amongst
cultivators and agricultural labourers (43% and 40%
respectively). This is in spite of the fact that farmer households
typically have on average 25% higher incomes. The demand
demonstrated reflects a largely untapped market of customers
traditionally excluded from the formal insurance market. The
livelihoods of landless labourers working in an agrarian
economy are also subject to rainfall risk, and substitute
instruments for risk management – assets, savings, credit – are
arguably less available to this sub-group.
Getting the timing right
In response to a question on why the households that rejected
our offer chose not to purchase the insurance product, the
primary barrier cited was current liquidity constraints (in other
words, insufficient current cash holdings). Other demand
constraints included ‘not trusting insurance’ or having a
premium price that is ‘too expensive’ – yet these two constraints
comprised only 13% of responses.
These observations suggest that one way to combat the negative
impact of household liquidity constraints on formal insurance
take-up would be to market the insurance to farmers during
seasonal periods when income is high, for example the end of
the Rabi season. Marketing campaigns targeted during the Rabi
season could significantly benefit farmers for two reasons: first,
as the farmers would have ‘cash on hand’ from the sale of the
Rabi crops their liquidity constraints would be reduced. Second,
as this would also be the time when farmers are making
planting decisions concerning the Kharif crops they could
consider their insurance coverage while making their investment
decisions. This is significant as knowledge of owning insurance
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decisions. This is significant as knowledge of owning insurance
can potentially alter their choices regarding which crops to
cultivate.
More weather stations
The study also finds that farmers are less willing to purchase
insurance when the automatic weather station measuring the
rainfall to calculate pay-outs is farther away. With a greater
distance between the weather stations and the farmer’s own
plot of land, the rainfall measured by the insurance company
may not closely track the rainfall conditions in the farmer’s
village. This imperfection in the product is known as ‘Basis
Risk.’ Basis risk lowers the demand for insurance, as farmers
may not be able to collect pay-outs even in the event of serious
crop losses. In our study, constructing new weather stations in
the specific villages where the insurance product was marketed
led to increased demand. This suggests that the value of index
insurance products could be significantly improved by building
more automatic weather stations where the index (rainfall, or
the onset of monsoon) can be reliably measured.
Complements and substitutes
Finally, the study indicates that when particular jatis (or sub-
castes) are already good at providing informal coverage against
village-level rainfall shocks (e.g. because the jati is diversified,
and many jati members are engaged in non-agricultural
occupations), members of those jatis are less likely to purchase
the rainfall insurance product. The informal network and the
formal insurance product are substitutes in that case. On the
other hand, when the jati network is less diversified and
therefore better at providing support following household-
specific losses (like death, illness, theft) than for losses that
affect the whole community (such as a delayed monsoon),
members of those jatis are more likely to purchase index
insurance. Especially when the formal insurance product carries
more basis risk (and can therefore fail farmers when they
sometimes need help), informal risk sharing of a certain type
can complement the market for index insurance as each type of
insurance compensates for a different type of risk, and the jati
network covers the imperfection in the index insurance
contract.
Lessons and implications
We find strong evidence of demand for insurance among people
who work on agricultural land but who are not farmers
themselves, a group that has traditionally been excluded from
the insurance market. This presents a clear opportunity for the
insurance market.
Yet while index insurance can lower the costs of selling
insurance and calculating pay-outs, it also introduces new
challenges, such as basis risk. Our research shows that pre-
existing informal risk sharing arrangements, such as jati
networks in India, clearly affect the demand for such products –
sometimes substituting for, and sometimes complementing,
formal insurance. In providing insurance for India’s uninsured,
these informal insurance mechanisms should not be overlooked.
Watch a video of Mushﬁq Mubarak presenting the underlying
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Watch a video of Mushﬁq Mubarak presenting the underlying
research at the 2nd IGC South Asia Growth Conference (July 2013;
New Delhi)
Formally insuring the informally insured: Mush q Mubara…
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